I. INTRODUCTION
"The devil died in December," and thousands cheered. "A shower of gunfire, and there was Pablo Escobar, a punctured corpse on a rooftop in Medellin, leaking life just like everyjudge and cop and political candidate he disposed of without a blink." 2 On Wednesday, I December 1993, Pablo Escobar celebrated his forty-fourth birthday. 3 On 2 December 1993, police and soldiers raided his hideout and gunned him down as he tried to escape over the rooftops. 4 After a lifetime of crime and twenty minutes of gunfire, the king of cocaine was dead.
The Colombian soldiers celebrated, cheering "we won." 5 President Clinton sent President Trugillo of Colombia a telegram congratulating him on the raid. 6 On that day, the world rejoiced and enjoyed a slight victory in the war on drugs.
Ultimately, however, United States officials recognized that Esco-They did, however, continue to utilize civil forfeiture as a means of enforcing the law.
5
After the ratification of the Constitution, the Federal government began enforcing forfeiture statutes. 26 Initially, the government used its forfeiture power to seize ships and cargos used in the illegal slave trade, as well as vessels involved in customs offenses. 2 7 Congress soon expanded its use of forfeiture, and "[f]or more than two hundred years, Congress has continued to pass civil, in rem, forfeiture statutes covering a substantial variety of property." 28 In fact, "contemporary federal and State forfeiture statutes reach virtually any type of property that might be used in the conduct of a criminal enterprise." 29 Until recently, two aspects of civil forfeiture had remained constant: its relative insignificance as a law enforcement tool 3 0 and the irrelevance of the innocence of the owner of property seized. 3 1 This irrelevance was "firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial jurisprupractice remain:
The concept of the deodand has been transformed by the historical process. A more secular society has substituted another sovereign, the government... for the Church and the Crown. Thus forfeited property is no longer 'applied to pious uses, and distributed in alms by the high almoner,' but rather it may, under appropriate circumstances, be either sold, destroyed, or retained for official use by the Attorney General. Id. See also 21 U.S.C. § 881(e) (1988 ( & Supp. V 1992 . In Goldsmith v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 510 (1921),Justice McKenna also recognized the influence of the deodand. He noted that Congress ascribed a degree of complicity and guilt to property associated with violations of the revenue provisions, which he saw as analogous to the law of deodand.
25 C.J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133, 139 (1943) . Long before the adoption of the Constitution, the colonial courts exercised in remi jurisdiction while enforcing English and local forfeiture statutes. During the Confederation period, the state courts did the same. Id. However, the law of forfeiture varied from colony to colony. For instance, statutes regulating forfeiture consequent to attainder were used extensively in Pennsylvania and Virginia, minimally in Massachusetts, and not at all in New York. James R. Maxeiner, Bane of American Forfeiture Law-Banished At LastP, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 768, 776-77 (1977) . The practice of forfeiture consequent to attainder, which called for the complete forfeiture of all real and personal property of convicted felons and traitors sentenced to death, was discarded after the ratification of the Constitution, because the practice deprived innocent heirs of their rightful inheritance, it "too easily dispensed with judicial findings of guilt," and because of a desire to "end all vestiges of the feudal era." Id. at 770, 779 n.68.
26 Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683 (1974) . 31 Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 683 ("[Tlhe innocence of the owner of property subject to forfeiture has almost uniformly been rejected as a defense."). Early British law allowed for seizure even if "no default is in the owner." HoLMEs, supra note 14, at 25.
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dence of the country." 3 2 In 1970, however, Congress propelled forfeiture into its present place in the front lines of the government's war on drugs and paved the way for the battle over innocent ownership rights.
B.
DEVELOPMENT OF 21 U.s.c. § 881
In an effort to strengthen law enforcement authority against drug trafficking, 3 3 Congress passed The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 as part of the Controlled Substances Act. 3 4 Congress recognized that the motivation for drug trafficking was economic profit 35 and realized that it needed something more than ordinary criminal sanctions, such as fines and imprisonment, to deter people from dealing drugs. 36 Congress sought a means of eliminating the economic gain and thus removing the incentive to participate in the drug trade. 3 7 Forfeiture became Congress' weapon of choice. 38 Originally, § 881 authorized the forfeiture of controlled substances, raw materials, containers, and conveyances used or intended for use in drug related activities. (No. 15, 612) , the Court upheld the forfeiture of a schooner seized for a violation of the embargo laws. ChiefJustice Marshall, writing for the majority, stated that the "proceeding [was one] against the vessel, for an offence committed by the vessel, which is not less an offence, and does not the less subject her to forfeiture because it was committed without the authority and against the will of the owner." In United States v. 1960 Bags of Coffee, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 398 (1814), the Court upheld the forfeiture of coffee sold in violation of the Non-Intercourse Act of 1809. Although the purchaser was innocent, the Court reasoned that "[i]n the eternal struggle that exists between the avarice, enterprize and combinations of individuals on the one hand, and the power charged with the administration of the laws on the other, severe laws are rendered necessary to enable the executive to carry into effect the measure of policy adopted by the legislature." Id. at 405. In 1877, the Court upheld the forfeiture of an innocent owner's property which housed a distillery in violation of the revenue laws (15 Stat. 132), declaring that the offense was "attached primarily to the distillery, and the real and personal property used in connection with the same, without any regard whatsoever to the personal misconduct or responsibility of the owner. 37 116 CONG. REc. 607 (1970) .
38 "Clearly, if law enforcement efforts to combat racketeering and drug trafficking are to be successful, they must include an attack on the economic aspects of these crimes. Forfeiture is the mechanism through which such an attack may be made." S. REP. No. 225, supra note 9, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3374.
39 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a): The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no property right shall exist in them:
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9NNOCENT OWER ized that the forfeiture laws were not producing the desired results. 40 Therefore, in 1978, Congress amended the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act and increased the effectiveness of forfeiture by expanding the scope of the forfeiture provision to allow the forfeiture of all proceeds derived from drug transactions. 4 1 In this manner, Congress hoped to strike directly at the heart of the problem-the potential to realize incredible profits through drug dealing. 4 2 By 1984, however, Congress remained unsatisfied with the impact of the expanded forfeiture laws. Drug profits were not being undercut. 43 Apparently the scope of property subject to forfeiture was still too limited for Congress' taste, because the statute did not provide for the forfeiture of real property, even if that property was instrumental to the performance of illicit activities. 44 As a result, in
(1) All controlled substances which have been manufactured, distributed, dispensed, or acquired in violation of this subchapter.
(2) All raw materials, products, and equipment of any kind which are used, or intended for use, in manufacturing, compounding, processing, delivering, importing, or exporting any controlled substance in violation of this subchapter.
(3) All property which is used or intended for use, as a container for property described in paragraph (1), (2), or (9).
(4) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are used, or are intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of property described in paragraph (1), (2), or (9).... 40 Senator Nunn realized that "[w]e were losing the battle as well as the war" against drugs. 124 CONG. REc. 23,055 (1978). 41 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (6): "All moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of value furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled substance in violation of this subchapter, all proceeds traceable to such an exchange, and all moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of this subchapter .... " Id.
42 According to Senator Nunn, "profit, astronomical profit, is the base motivation of drug traffickers. The amendment I propose here today is intended to enhance the efforts to reduce the flow of illicit drugs in the United States by striking out against the profits from illicit drug trafficking." 124 CONG. REc. 23,055 (1978). Senator John Culver also calculated that this expansion of the forfeiture laws would "disrupt drug trafficking by greatly raising the risk of such trafficking, reducing the profits involved and immobilizing certain drug rings by seizing large amounts of their assets." Id at 23,056.
43 A study released in 1981 by the General Accounting Office (GAO), entitled AssEr FoaFmrruREa-A SELDOM UsED TOOL IN COMBATrING DRUG TRAFFMKING, reported two major reasons why the forfeiture statutes had failed to meet Congress' expectations: federal law enforcement agencies had not aggressively pursued forfeiture, and current forfeiture statutes had too many limitations and ambiguities, which prevented forfeiture's full potential from being realized. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 9, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3374.
William Anderson, the director of the GAO, noted that in 1979, drug trafficking produced an estimated $54 billion worth of income for drug dealers, but forfeitures amounted to less than $35 million. In other words, the drug dealers were able to retain almost 99% of their profits-a clear indication that forfeiture had not succeeded in depriving dealers of their economic base. A civil forfeiture occurs when the government takes illegally used or acquired property without compensating its owner. 46 A forfeiture action, an in rem procedure, 47 commences when the government seizes property believed to be connected with illegal drug activity. Ownership of the property vests in the government at the time the property is used for an illegal purpose. 49 But once the government has seized the property, it must begin a formal forfeiture action within five years of the discovery of the alleged offense. 50 Initially, the burden of proof is on the government to show probable cause that the seized property was connected with illegal drug activity. 51 Courts have defined probable cause as "a reasonable ground for belief of guilt, supported by less than prima facie proof, civil forfeiture. But if he uses a secluded barn to store tons of marihuana or uses his house as a manufacturing laboratory for amphetamines, there is no provision to subject his real property to civil forfeiture, even though its use was indispensable to the commission of a major drug offense and the prospect of the forfeiture of the property would have been a powerful deterrent. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 9, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3378.
45 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (7) (1988) reads in pertinent part: "All real property, including any right, title, and interest (including any leasehold interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land and any appurtenances or improvements, which is used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, a violation of this subchapter.... " Id. 46 BuREAu OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DRUGS, CRIME, AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 156 (Dec. 1992).
47 An in rem procedure is a procedure "against the thing." Action is taken against the property rather than the person, and the purpose is to affect the person ' Historically, the only remedy for an innocent owner with an interest in forfeited property was to petition the United States Attorney General for remission or mitigation. 54 Property owners could not prevent forfeiture of their ownership rights by arguing that they were innocent of drug activity; they could merely request that the Attorney General return all or part of the property. 5 5 In 1978, however, Congress amended § 881(a) (6) and provided protection for owners who had no "knowledge or consent" of the illegal activity in which their property was involved. 56 When real property became forfeitable under § 881, Congress added another "innocent owner" provision to protect property owners whose property had been used in violation of the law without their "knowledge or consent." 57 In 1988, an amendment to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (4) added a requirement that claimants prove the illegal activity occurred without their "knowledge, consent, 
55
Id. 56 The "innocent owner" defense states that "no property shall be forfeited under this paragraph, to the extent of the interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by that owner to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner." 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (6) (1988).
57 "[N]o property shall be forfeited under this'paragraph, to the extent of an interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by that owner to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner." 2f U.S.C. § 881 (a) (7) (1988). The fact that (a) (6) refers to "the interest of an owner," and (a) (7) refers to "an interest of an owner," appears to be an irrelevant distinction. -or willful blindness." 58 Congress added "willful blindness" to ensure that the owner of a conveyance would not purposefully avoid gaining knowledge of illegal activity. 60 The inclusion of (a) (7) may have increased the government's ability to subject property to forfeiture, but the language Congress chose-"without the knowledge or consent of that owner" 6 1 -has caused confusion in the courts.
The big question is whether courts should read the phrase "without knowledge or consent" in the conjunctive or in the disjunctive: does it mean "without knowledge and without consent," or "without knowledge or without consent?" For example, a landlord claims to be the "innocent owner" of an apartment building in a drug case. He can establish that he never gave his consent to use his building during drug deals. The question is whether the statute also requires him to prove that he had no knowledge that dealers were using his building to traffic drugs.
Four circuits have addressed this issue. Both the Ninth and the Eleventh Circuits have interpreted the "innocent owner" provision in the conjunctive and would require the landlord to prove lack of consent and knowledge. 62 In contrast, the Second and Third Circuits in-58 For a time, innocent owners enjoyed a bit more protection from forfeiture of conveyed property. Until 1988, a conveyance could not be forfeited if it was used as a common carrier in a business transaction and the illegal activity occurred without the owner's consent, or if the illegal act occurred while the conveyance was in the unlawful possession of the person who violated the law. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (4) (A) & (B). However, Congress added § 881(a) (4) (C) which states that "no conveyance shall be forfeited under this paragraph to the extent of an interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by that owner to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge, consent, or willful blindness of the owner." 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (4) (C) (1988 [Vol. 85 terpret the phrase in the disjunctive. 63 The Sixth Circuit has suggested that courts read the statute in the disjunctive, but it has not directly decided the issue.64
IV. THE BOTrOM LmE
Those who argue that courts must read the phrase "without knowledge or consent" in the disjunctive claim that canons of statutory construction, the statute's legislative history, and general fairness require that interpretation. This comment will demonstrate that none of these grounds is ultimately persuasive. Instead, the "innocent owner" provision of § 881(a) (7), as promulgated by Congress, unambiguously requires that claimants prove both a lack of consent and a lack of knowledge to prevent forfeiture of their property.
A. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
As a general rule, the established canons of statutory construction require that "terms connected by a disjunctive be given separate meanings, unless the context dictates otherwise." 65 Certain courts have held that this rule entitles claimants to prove either a lack of knowledge or a lack of consent. 66 In their view, Congress' use of the word "or" is conclusive evidence that claimants have the option of proving either fact. 67 For 
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claimant to attempt to prove his lack of consent to illegal drug activity on his property after he conceded his knowledge of the same activity. 69 The claimant owned a building in a drug infested area. 70 The police believed that most of the drug activity occurred in a second floor apartment and asked the claimant to file trespassing charges against any non-tenants arrested on his property. 71 After initially refusing, the claimant cooperated for a while, but soon stopped. 72 The government seized the building. 73 Afterwards, the claimant admitted that he knew about the illegal activity in his building, but argued that he only needed to prove a lack of consent to that activity to avoid forfeiture. 74 The court agreed, reasoning that under the canons of statutory construction, it was obliged to "give effect to Congress' use of the word 'or' by reading the terms 'knowledge' and 'consent' disjunctively." 75 The court's adherence to a rule which places such blind faith in Congress' use of language is probably misplaced. In many cases courts have recognized that the word "or" simply does not mean "or." 76 In De Sylva v. Ballentine, 77 the United States Supreme Court held that courts should not conclude that a statute must be read in the disjunctive simply because it contains the word "or." 7 8 In De Sylva, a composer died before renewing the copyrights on some of his musical compositions. 79 Under the Copyright Act, "the author of such work, if still living, or the widow, widower, or children of the author, if the author be not living ... shall be entitled to a renewal." 80 The mother of the deceased composer's illegitimate son sued to insure the boy's interest in the copyrights. 8 1 She argued that because the statute used the word "or" in the conjunctive, her son had a present interest [Vol. 85 in the property. 8 2 The composer's widow, however, claimed that the statute employed the word "or" in the disjunctive, and therefore she had an exclusive right to the copyrights until her death. 8 3 After reviewing prior copyright acts, the Court determined that it should read the statute in the conjunctive, and the phrase "or the widow, widower, or children," meant "or the widow, widower, and children." 8 4 The Court recognized that "the word 'or' is often used as a careless substitute for the word 'and'; that is, it is often used in phrases where 'and' would express the thought with greater clarity." 8 5 Even assuming that Congress was not careless, but intentionally selected the word "or," a conjunctive interpretation is still correct under these circumstances. This is one of those cases where the word "or" creates a multiple rather than an alternative obligation. 86 In fact, logic compels that conclusion. A principal of logic known as De Morgan's theorem establishes that "[tihe negation of [a] disjunction of two statements is logically equivalent to the conjunction of their negations." 8 7 The phrase "knowledge or consent" is ordinarily a disjunction: the existence of one of two alternatives-knowledge or consent-satisfies its terms. 8 8 If § 881 (a) (7) required claimants to prove their "knowledge or consent," they would only have to prove one or the other. However, Congress worded § 881 (a) (7) in the negative; claimants must prove they were "without knowledge or consent." According to De Morgan's theorem, the use of the word "without" is the negation of the disjunction which follows, and is equivalent to the phrase "without knowledge and without consent." 89 Therefore, claimants must prove both a lack of knowledge and a lack of consent. 90 Judge Greenberg of the Third Circuit, without mentioning any 82 Id. at 572. applicable theory of formal logic, advanced this argument as a canon of statutory construction. He suggested that Congress may have used "or" to create a conjunctive, requiring claimants to prove both a lack of knowledge and a lack of consent. 9 1 Judge Greenberg focused on the general rule that each term connected by a disjunctive must be given a separate meaning. 92 He reasoned that the words "knowledge" and "consent" each relate back to the offense, so if the government had the burden of proving claimants' "knowledge or consent," 9 3 the prosecutor could satisfy the statute by proving either one.
9 4 He concluded that substituting the term "with" for "without" makes that point clear, 95 and therefore claimants must prove both. 9 6 The government has also relied upon De Morgan's theorem. In United States v. 890 Noyac Rd., 9 7 the government cited De Morgan's theorem in support of its argument that courts should read the "innocent owner" provision of § 881(a) (7) in the conjunctive. 98 The government pointed out that reading the clause in the disjunctive is "painfully inconsistent with one of the most fundamental rules of grammar and syntax." 9 9 Although the court ultimately agreed, and found that the clause should be read in the conjunctive, it based its holding on canons of statutory construction, legislative history, 10 0 and subsequent indications of Congressional intent. 10 1 The court was hesitant to rest its decision upon De Morgan's theorem, because, as Judge Wexler stated, "logic and syntax do not exist in a vacuum." 10 2 Judge Wexler's concern echoes that ofJustice Holmes, who once noted that the scope of a specific clause within a statute should not be limited to its particular subject matter, and that a statute's "general 91 "In as much as the words 'knowledge' and 'consent' are separated by an 'or' they are disjunctive and each relates back to the offense. Accordingly, unless the owner demonstrates that the offenses were committed without either her knowledge or consent she loses. It is that simple." United States v. 6109 Grubb Rd., 890 F.2d 659, 661 (3d Cir. 1989), sur petition for reh 'g (Greenberg, J., dissenting). [Vol. 85 purpose is a more important aid to the meaning than any rule which grammar or formal logic may lay down." 10 3 Many courts agree and attempt to use a statute's general purpose to determine Congressional intent when a statute's grammar appears to lead to a result that is contrary to its stated purpose. 10 4 Courts interpreting the "innocent owner" provision of § 881 (a) (7) should adhere to Justice Holmes' suggestion, because a conjunctive reading of the "innocent owner" clause is not only grammatically and logically correct, 0 5 but it also comports with Congress' announced purpose in § 881(a) (7): to "enhance the use of forfeiture... as a law enforcement tool in combating one of the most serious crime problems facing the country." 10 6 By contrast, reading § 881 (a) (7) in the disjunctive would make it easier for property owners to resist forfeiture-including owners who know about the illegal activity on their property and implicitly condone it.10 7 Given the otherwise sweeping scope of Congress' action in this area, it seems highly unlikely that Congress intended such a result, when its primary concern was to remove the profit motive from drug trafficking.
Using a similar canon of construction, several courts insist that the "innocent owner" provision of § 881 (a) (7) must allow claimants to prove either a lack of knowledge or a lack of consent, because any other reading would render the "consent" prong of the clause superfluous.' 0 8 Since, under a conjunctive interpretation, knowledge of an illegal activity is sufficient for the government to take a claimant's property, courts would not permit claimants who fail to prove a lack of I] n the context of § 881, the phrase 'know or consent' would lead to absurd results if it were read as giving claimant the option of proving either one or the other. For then it would be possible for an owner to know about, and perhaps even tacitly condone illegal drug activity, and yet still be able to claim that she did not 'know or consent' to the activity.").
108 knowledge to offer proof that they did not consent to the illegal activity.
10 9 This construction of § 881(a) (7), they reason, "completely disregards the word 'consent'."" 0 In addition, these courts apparently assume that knowledge is a prerequisite to consent. They posit that under a conjunctive interpretation, courts will not consider the issue of consent until the claimant proves a lack of knowledge. They reason that since a claimant must know about illegal drug activity to consent to it, requiring claimants to prove a lack of both knowledge and consent requires deserving claimants to do the impossible."' Both of these arguments are defective. The idea that courts must read § 881 (a) (7) in the disjunctive to give appropriate weight to the "consent" prong fails, because even under a disjunctive interpretation the issue of "consent" is not raised. Once claimants demonstrate their lack of knowledge, they do not need to show a lack of consent, because they have satisfied the terms of the statute-even if they were willfully blind (i.e., suspected drug activity, but condoned it by doing nothing) .112 Also, the premise upon which these courts rely-that it is impossible to consent to something without first having knowledge of it-is erroneous. 113 The manner in which the courts have defined the terms "knowledge" and "consent" makes it possible for claimants to consent to illegal drug activity on their property without having knowledge of that activity. The "innocent owner" provision of § 881 (a) (7) does not define either of these words. As a result, the courts have had to develop and apply their own definitions.
A majority of courts, whether they follow a conjunctive or disjunctive interpretation, have found that by "knowledge," Congress meant "actual" knowledge, rather than "constructive" knowledge. 1 ference is significant. A standard requiring "constructive" knowledge forces claimants to prove that they had no knowledge of illegal activity and that they had no reason to know about it. Under an "actual" knowledge standard, however, claimants need to show only that they had no personal knowledge of illicit drug activity on their property. Similarly, although some courts have defined "consent" to include implicit as well as explicit approval by requiring claimants to take all reasonable steps to prevent the illegal use of their property," 5 most courts and commentators define "consent" solely as an express approval of illegal activity. This combination of actual knowledge and explicit consent allows claimants to consent to something without first having knowledge of it. For instance, consider a homeowner who takes a vacation and asks a friend to house-sit. The homeowner, aware that the friend sells drugs, tells the friend to make himself at home. The friend moves in and begins selling drugs. The homeowner has no actual knowledge of his friend's drug dealing in the house and has not given express consent to use the house for such purposes. Consider also an absentee landlord who rents to a suspected drug dealer, but remains indifferent to the use of his property." 7 These examples illustrate that it is possible to impliedly consent to something without having actual knowledge of it. Courts which afford claimants this luxury encourage the type of "willful blindness" that allows those with some level of culpability to avoid an otherwise proper forfeiture.
Although principles of logic and canons of construction compel a conjunctive reading of the "innocent owner" provision of § 881 (a) (7), the fact that many courts have read this provision in the disjunctive 788 (S.D. Fla. 1988 117 SeeJudge Greenberg's dissent in 6109 Grubb Rd., 890 F.2d at 662, which relies on the 'actual knowledge" standard adhered to by most courts. Here, the hypothetical landlord was clearly on notice that illegal activity could occur on his property, yet he chose to ignore the possibility. This state of mind, referred to as "willful blindness," and its place in the "innocent owner" clause of § 881(a) (7), is discussed infra at notes 157 to 160 and accompanying text.
1994]
suggests that it is hopelessly abstruse.' 18 And those charged with interpreting this provision must go beyond mere examination of its plain meaning in order to discern congressional intent.
B.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
(a)(6) as Evidence of the Proper Interpretation of (a)(7)
When it is impossible to determine Congressional intent by examining a statute's language, it is necessary to turn to legislative history. 1 9 However, in enacting § 881(a) (7), Congress focused more on improving criminal forfeiture than on expanding the types of property subject to civil forfeiture. As a result, the legislative history of § 881 (a) (7) is extremely sparse. The only mention of the "innocent owner" provision was the announcement that § 881 (a) (7) "would also include an 'innocent owner' exception like that now included in" § (a) (6).120 Thus, many courts have turned to the legislative history of § 881 (a) (6) in interpreting § 881 (a) (7). 121 For example, in United States v. 6109 Grubb Road, the government seized the property of a suspected drug trafficker. 122 After the defendant was convicted of drug trafficking, the government initiated the forfeiture of the property under § 881 (a) (7).123 The defendant's wife raised the innocent owner defense, claiming that she neither knew of nor consented to the illicit activity. 124 When she failed to prove a lack of knowledge, the court considered whether she could still attempt to prove a lack of consent. The court noted that the legislative history of § 881 (a) (7) was insufficient 25 and stated that because the legislative history of § 881 (a) (7) refers to § 881 (a) (6), the court "must also look to the legislative history of that section .... ,"126 The portion deemed relevant was a joint congressional committee report which stated that the property encompassed by § 881(a) (6) "would 118 The Second Circuit recognized that "the plain language of section 881(a) (7) not be subject to forfeiture unless the owner of such property knew or consented to" the use of the property for illegal drug activity.
127
Although principles of logic would require courts to consider Congress' use of a negative as a requisite that claimants prove both elements, the court concluded that it should read § 881(a) (7) in the disjunctive and allowed the wife to offer proof of lack of consent.
128
The court in 6109 Grubb Road reached this conclusion by neglecting the very piece of legislative history it had cited. After stating the necessity of referring to the legislative history of § 881 (a) (6), and pointing to the specific passage from the committee report, the court simply ignored the statement's implications that claimants must prove a lack of both knowledge and consent. 129 Instead, the court found that canons of statutory construction require a disjunctive reading. 3 0 Had the court examined the passage, it would have become clear that the phrase "unless the owner of such property knew or consented to" establishes that if claimants either know about or consent to illicit drug activity, they cannot succeed in demonstrating innocent ownership.' 3 ' Stated in the positive, the phrase would read: "the property would be subject to forfeiture unless the owner of such property neither knew of nor consented to" the illegal conduct. Therefore, claimants must prove a lack of both knowledge and consent. Thus, the legislative history of § 881(a) (7) demonstrates that Congress intended to create an "innocent owner" clause "like that [one] now included in" § 881 (a) (6), which is read in the conjunctive. Judge Greenberg correctly realized "that Congress has been consistent in its use of the... phrase 'knew or consented,'" and claimants must therefore prove both a lack of knowledge and a lack of consent to satisfy the "innocent owner" provision of § 881(a) (7 
131
The court in Lot 111-B based its decision entirely upon this explanation, stating first that "a congressional joint committee report explaining the identical language of Section 881 (a) (6) leaves no doubt as to the proper interpretation of the 'knew or consented' language," and then concluding that "if the claimant either knew or consented to the illegal activities, the 'innocent owner' defense is unavailable." United States v. Lot 111-B, 902 F.2d 1443, 1445 (9th Cir. 1990).
One commentator asserts that although the explanatory statement is persuasive, it is not conclusive because it places the burden of proof on the government, which is inconsistent with established forfeiture procedure. See Loomba, supra note 90, at 484. The statement, however, does not suggest a shifting of burdens, it merely attempts to clarify Congressional intent by presenting an alternative way to view the necessary statutory requirements.
132 6109 Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d at 663. One commentator argues that the legislative history
Recent Revelations Regarding § 881(a)(7)
Although the legislative history of § 881 (a) (6) offers insight into Congress' intent regarding the "innocent owner" provision of § 881 (a) (7), the fact that Congress did not comment further on § 881 (a) (7) leaves open the question 'of whether Congress itself read the "innocent owner" clause in the conjunctive or the disjunctive. However, the subsequent legislative history of § 881 (a) (7) provides additional evidence that Congress intended the "innocent owner" clause of § 881 (a) (7) to require that claimants prove a lack of both knowledge and consent.
Generally, courts do not consider subsequent legislative history helpful in determining Congress' original intent when enacting a statute. In fact, the Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned that subsequent legislative history is normally an unreliable way of discerning Congressional intent. 13 3 Yet the Court has recognized that in certain circumstances subsequent legislative history is a useful guide to congressional intent, and the Court has continued to use it as a valid interpretive tool.' 3 4 For example, in Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., Shell bought the rights to an oil shale claim that was discovered in 1918. 135 The Department of the Interior denied Shell's claim, finding it invalid because oil shale was not considered a valuable mineral deposit under the general mining laws of 1872.136 The Court relied on subsequent legislative history and department action-including Department of the Interior instructions issued after the 1920 Act went into effect-to determine that pre-1920 oil shale claims were valid under the Act.' 3 7 of § 881 (a) (6) is inapplicable to § 881 (a) (7) because § 881 (a) (6) applies exclusively to bona fide purchasers. See O'Brien, supra note 116, at 537-40. This argument has been rendered moot by the United States Supreme Court's decision in United States v. 92 Buena Vista Avenue, 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993). The Court interpreted the "innocent owner, clause of § 881 (a) (6), and held that "the protection afforded to innocent owners is not limited to bona fide purchasers." Id. at 1134. The Court, in a plurality decision, noted that the term "owner" appears in the statute three times, and is never qualified. According to the Court, "[s]uch language is sufficiently unambiguous to foreclose any contention that it applies only to bona fide purchasers." Id. at 1139.
Since § 881(a) (6) does not apply exclusively to bona fide purchasers, courts can, and should use its legislative history and its conjunctive construction to discern Congress' intent regarding § 881(a) (7). The Supreme Court points out that it should not consider a statute's subsequent legislative history when it can glean the statute's meaning by its language or its legislative history. 140 This is sound advice, but since the plain language of § 881(a) (7) is what has caused the controversy, and since there is no specific legislative history to illuminate the question, any subsequent discussion of the provision is helpful in understanding how courts should read the clause.
Numerous members of Congress have proposed amendments to the "innocent owner" provision of § 881 (a) (7) to bring it into conformity with the "innocent owner" provision of § 881 (a) (4) as amended in -1988.141 Those proposed amendments would have added "willful blindness" as an additional element of the "innocent owner" defense. 142 For instance, Senator Dole introduced the National Drug Control Strategy Implementation Act of 1990 on behalf of the office of National Drug Control Policy. The bill included an amended version of the "innocent owner" clause of § 881(a) (7) to replace the phrase "without the knowledge or consent of that owner," with "without the knowledge, consent, or willful blindness of the owner." This particular change was designed to clearly establish that claimants with knowledge of illegal drug activity cannot avoid forfeiture merely by showing a lack of consent to that activity. The accompanying analysis of the amendment states that it is "intended that, in order to establish the innocent owner exemption, the property owner must establish all three circumstances-i.e., that the owner lacked knowledge, consent, and willful blindness as to the offense giving rise to forfeiture." 143 It expressly condemned the 6109 Grubb Road decision that claimants could prove either a lack of knowledge or a lack of consent,'4 and announced that the "addition of the 'willful blindness' prong under- May 18, 1990) . 142 Id. at S6595. "Sections 511(a) (6) and (7) of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 881(a) (6) and (7)) are each amended by striking 'without the knowledge or consent of that owner' and inserting in lieu thereof 'without the knowledge, consent, or willful blindness of the owner. ... Id. 143 Id. at S6605. 144 Id. at S6605-06.
scores the incorrectness of' the holding in 6109 Grubb Road, "since it makes no sense that an owner could prevail by showing a lack of willful blindness to the offense even though the owner had knowledge of the offense and consented to it."1 45
Although this amendment did not pass, the significance of the proposal should not be underestimated. Congress enacted § 881 (a) (7) in 1984, but the question of how to read the "innocent owner" clause was not raised in the circuits until 1989. This amendmentwhich directly addresses that question-was introduced less than one year later. Additionally, the agency in charge of setting drug policy suggested the amendment. 1 4 6 In fact, Senator Biden proposed an identical amendment, 147 and the Senate approved an identical amendment as part of the Omnibus Crime Bill of 1990.148 Senator Kennedy also introduced an amendment to the "innocent owner" provision of § 881(a) (7) and was even more careful to insure that courts would read it in the conjunctive. He replaced the current clause with: "if the owner establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the act or omission giving rise to the forfeiture was committed or omitted without the owner's knowledge, without his or her consent, and without his or her willful blindness.
" 149 Apparently, Congress is attempting to clarify the ambiguity in § 881 (a) (7) that has plagued courts for almost ten years.
C. FAIRNESS
Courts reading the "innocent owner" provision of § 881 (a) (7) in the disjunctive believe that requiring owners to forfeit their property merely because they had knowledge of illegal activity would lead to unduly harsh results.1 50 They feel that Congress enacted the "innocent owner" defense to shield those with knowledge, but not responsibility for the crime, from the severity of forfeiture.' 5 ' Accordingly, they assert that forcing claimants to prove a lack of both knowledge and consent wrongly treats those with knowledge as full participants 145 Id. at S6606. 146 136 CONG. REc. S6586 (daily ed. May 18, 1990). Although Chevron, U.S., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984), probably does not obligate courts to defer to agency interpretation in civil forfeiture cases, the fact that the people who set drug policy, and the agency enforcing the statute-the Department of Justice through its prosecutors-interpret § 881 (a) (7) in the conjunctive is persuasive. [Vol. 85 in a crime.
152
Those courts adhering to a conjunctive interpretation maintain that Congress' primary purpose in enacting § 881 (a) (7) was to remove the profit motive from drug trafficking by seizing all real property substantially connected to that trafficking. 153 Thus, allowing claimants who were aware of illicit drug activity on their property to avoid forfeiture is contrary .to Congressional policy 5 4 and would severely undermine the efficiency of the Government's forfeiture effort.1 55 To determine whether or not the "innocent owner" clause of § 881 (a) (7) -creates injustices under certain circumstances, it is necessary to examine the terms "knowledge" and "consent." As stated, a majority of courts have ruled that Congress intended "knowledge" to mean "actual" knowledge, rather than "constructive" knowledge. 5 6 Obviously, a standard based on actual knowledge creates less of a burden for claimants to meet than a standard based on constructive knowledge, because claimants need to show only that they had no personal knowledge of illegal drug activity on their property.
57
Even though actual knowledge is less of a burden for claimants, the actual knowledge standard is most likely the correct interpretation of Congress' intent. The legislative history of § 881(a) (4) indicates that Congress did not intend the term "knowledge" to encompass the concept of truth avoidance. The initial proposal in 1988 to amend § 881 (a) (4) by adding an "innocent owner" provision did not contain any language referring to willful blindness. Congress later added a "willful blindness" prong to alleviate concerns that the amendment "would lead to a 'look-the-other-way' defense," 5 8 and to "prevent the owner of a conveyance from closing his eyes to a violation."' 159 Therefore, the absence of a "willful blindness" prong in § 881 (a) (7) "constrains courts to employ. 162 After the authorities found marijuana on board, they seized the yacht pursuant to the Puerto Rican Controlled Substances Act.' 63 The leasing company learned of the seizure when it tried to repossess the vessel from the lessees who had failed to pay their rent.1 64 Although the claimant was not involved with the illegal activity, and had no knowledge of it, the Court, in an opinion byJustice Brennan, upheld the constitutionality of the forfeiture procedure under the statute. The Court noted that the leasing company voluntarily entrusted the lessees with the yacht and offered no proof that it had done all that it reasonably could have done to prevent its property from being used illegally.' 65 In much cited dicta, however, the Court acknowledged that it might be unconstitutional to cause property owners to forfeit their property if those owners were both uninvolved in, and unaware of, the illegal activity, and if they had done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent that illegal use. 166 This dicta has become known as the "Calero-Toledo" defense and has prompted courts to consider whether such a standard is applicable to cases originating under § 881 (a) (7), and if so, the extent to which it applies.
Presently, courts have taken one of three positions regarding the Calero-Toledo defense and § 881 (a) (7). Certain courts have concluded that the Calero-Toledo defense is not applicable to cases originating under § 881 (a) (7).167 Other courts have incorporated the Congress has proposed amendments to § 881 (a) (7) which include the insertion of a "willful blindness" prong also indicates the current constraints on how courts define "knowledge." See supra section IV B-2.
161 416 U.S. 663 (1974) . 162 Id. at 665. 163 Id. 164 Id. at 668. 165 Id. at 690. 166 Id. at 689. Also, in dicta, the Court related two situations which might create an exception to the rule that the innocence of the owner is irrelevant to forfeiture proceedings:
[I] t would be difficult to reject the constitutional claim of an owner whose property subjected to forfeiture had been taken from him without his privity or consent .... Similarly, the same might be said of an owner who proved not only that he was uninvolved in and unaware of the wrongful activity, but also that he had done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed use of his property; for, in that circumstance, it would be difficult to conclude that forfeiture served legitimate purposes and was not unduly oppressive. 1NNOCENT OWNER defense into the "innocent owner" provision of § 881 (a) (7) as an additional requirement which claimants must prove to avoid forfeiture. 16 8 And yet another group of courts has used the Calero-Toledo dicta to define the boundaries of the term "consent." 69 Those courts which reject the applicability of the Calero-Toledo defense to cases arising under § 881 (a) (7) maintain that the Supreme Court's statement in Calero-Toledo is irrelevant because it "dealt with constitutional defenses to a forfeiture statute which did not incorporate the express 'knowledge or consent' defense contained in § 881 (a) (7)."170 These courts seem to believe that the statute's definitions of "knowledge" and "consent" do not encompass the Calero-Toledo standard of reasonable steps. 17 1 In fact, these courts contend that had Congress intended to incorporate the Calero-Toledo standard into the "innocent owner" defense of § 881 (a) (7), it would have done so, because the Supreme Court decided Calero-Toledo ten years before Congress enacted § 881(a) (7).172 Because Congress did not adopt that requirement, courts cannot read the statute to include it now.
Those courts which have incorporated the Calero-Toledo defense into the "innocent owner" clause of § 881(a) (7) have not provided much explanation for doing so. They apparently believe that the Supreme Court's dicta revealed the extent of the burden borne by claimants seeking the innocent ownership exemption. Therefore, not only are claimants required to prove their lack of "actual" knowledge or lack of consent or both, but also that they did all that could be reasonably expected to prevent illicit use of their property.
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Lastly, those courts which use the Calero-Toledo standard to define the borders of the "consent" requirement of the "innocent owner' clause of § 881 (a) (7) seem to view it as a rationalization for interpreting the statute in the disjunctive. 174 Once claimants have actual knowledge of illegal activity on their property, they can avoid forfeiture only by proving a lack of consent, which is accomplished by showing that they have done all that could reasonably be expected of them to prevent that illegal activity from continuing. This approach is touted as balancing the announced congressional purposes of preventing drug trafficking and protecting the constitutional rights of innocent owners. 
The Correct Application
Courts should not incorporate the Calero-Toledo defense into § 881 (a) (7) to impose an additional burden on claimants. Had Congress wanted to codify the Calero-Toledo standard in § 881(a) (7), it could have done so when it added that provision in 1984. Legislative history of the 1988 amendments to § 881 (a) (4) lends strength to this conclusion. When Congress debated the addition of a "willful blindness" prong to § 881 (a) (4), those who endorsed the idea made it clear that "this section [was] not intended to overturn existing case law rendered under the Supreme Court decision in Calero-Toledo ... -"176 The "willful blindness" provision of § 881 (a) (4) was meant to require the same "reasonable expectation" standard as courts adopting the CaleroToledo standard had required. 177 Since Congress added a "willful standard similar to that used in 11885 46th Street).
174 United States v. Ponce, 751 F. Supp. 1436 , 1441 (D. Haw. 1990 . ("Mere knowledge of illicit activity on one's property is enough to allow forfeiture of that property, if the claimant does not do all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the illegal activity once he or she learns of it.").
175 "We find the Calero-Toledo standard appropriate for section 881 (a) (7) forfeiture cases because, when combined with our construction of the phrase 'knowledge or consent,' it provides a balance between the two congressional purposes of making drug trafficking prohibitively expensive for the property owner and preserving the property of an innocent owner." United States v. 
.").
A significant difference between courts following this standard, and those courts using the Calero-Toledo dicta as an additional prong, is that claimants are expected to have taken reasonable steps after the illicit activity has been discovered. In jurisdictions where the Calero-Toledo defense is considered a separate requirement, claimants must prove that they took reasonable steps to prevent wrongful activity from occurring at all. 176 134 CONG. REc. H11,108, Hl1,245 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988). 177 "The language of Calero-Toledo and the line of cases that follow require property owners to be reasonably informed concerning the purpose for which another person may use their property. This provision in the bill before us is intended to allow the courts to deter-blindness" prong to the "innocent owner" clause of § 881(a) (4), but has not added one to the "innocent owner" clause of § 881(a) (7), Congress cannot have intended the Calero-Toledo standard to apply to the "innocent owner" clause of that provision.' 78 Therefore, as the statute is written, claimants ought to be able to demonstrate a lack of consent simply by showing that they gave no express approval to the illegal activity.
Applying Definitions to Determination of Fairness
The proper definitions of both "knowledge" and "consent" create the minimum burden for claimants. They have to show only that they had no actual knowledge of the particular activity giving rise to forfeiture and that they did not expressly consent to it. But combining the low threshold Congress has created for successful claimants with a disjunctive interpretation of the "innocent owner" provision of § 881 (a) (7) leads to results which are both undesirable and contrary to Congress' stated intent. 179 Under such a reading, owners could tacidy condone illegal drug activity on their property without giving express consent and avoid forfeiture even though they had actual knowledge. 189 However, because the court interpreted the "innocent owner" provision of § 881 (a) (7) in the disjunctive, the claimant avoided forfeiture by proving lack of consent.' 90 The injustice of this outcome was made possible because the court interpreted the statute in the disjunctive. The court noted that the claimant had cooperated with the police by pressing trespassing charges and allowing the police to raze the barricades erected by the drug dealers. 1 9 The court then stated, that given the statute's requirements, it could not "comprehend why [the claimant] was obligated to provide even this much cooperation in order to avoid forfeiture .
"... 192
The court noted however, that being arrested for trespassing was only a minor inconvenience, because "two hours later they would be back."' 93 Further, instead of forbidding his tenants from putting up the fences and steel doors, the landlord forced the police to expend resources and energy tearing them down. And the large sums of cash generated from the sale of drugs made it simple for the dealers to have the barricades quickly replaced. 194 The claimant argued that he felt threatened by the drug dealers and did not want to risk getting injured. 195 Although this explanation may have been true, and would make his actions reasonable, any collaborator wishing to avoid forfeiture could raise this defense. Such a defense, if allowed, would gut the government's efforts to abate drug trafficking.
A conjunctive interpretation provides the government with a greater ability to combat drug trafficking. That interpretation may also lead to injustice under certain circumstances where owners genuinely try to stop illegal drug activity on their property. 19 owners who find themselves in that situation honestly desire to rid their property of the illicit activity, they should notify the proper authorities. Those authorities could take the steps necessary to alleviate the problem and protect the owners from any potential harm. Even if the owners' relatives are involved in the illegal activity, the law does not allow them to do anything less. "At some point the obligations of citizenship in a drug-ridden society must overcome [ 200 the Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the government from seizing real property without first giving the owner notice and the opportunity to contest the seizure at a pre-seizure hearing.
2 0 '
The application of these provisions to civil forfeiture provides ample protection against potential inequities. Also, the constitutional concerns discussed in Calero-Toledo would not arise within the context of a § 881(a) (7) forfeiture. The Court noted that forfeiture may be unconstitutional if claimants had neither "actual" nor "constructive" knowledge (i.e. they truly had no idea), and that they did everything they could do-prior to the illegal use of their property-to prevent that illegal use from occurring. 20 2 A conjunctive interpretation of § 881 (a) (7) does not allow forfeiture in that situation. As stated, under § 881 (a) (7) property cannot be forfeited unless claimants had "actual" knowledge or explicitly consented to illegal activity. According to the Court in Calero-Toledo, once either of several searches of the property and found drugs belonging to some of the children. After authorities seized the house, one of his daughters testified that her father had taken all reasonable steps to prevent illegal drug activity on his property. The claimant's daughter testified that once her father learned that his children brought drugs into the house, he kicked them out, and encouraged them to enter drug abuse treatment programs. He also put new locks on the doors and nailed the windows shut to prevent them from returning until they were no longer using drugs. Under a conjunctive interpretation, the claimant could still have lost his home. The court might not have considered the steps he took to prevent his children from bringing drugs onto his property. To argue that a conjunctive reading of the "innocent owner" provision of § 881 (a) (7) is improper because it may result in unfairness, is to forget why Congress enacted the statute. Congress' purpose was to strengthen the government's ability to fight illegal drug trafficking-an effort ivhich already costs the American public tens of billions of dollars a year and has been largely unsuccessful. 20 4 The fact that Congress provided some protection for innocent owners cannot allow the statute as a whole to be suborned. It is important to remember that prior to the enactment of § 881 (a) (7), real property owners had no defense at all against forfeiture.
2 0 5 Congress appears to have recognized the need to protect truly innocent owners. However, Congress did not give owner's rights precedence over the government's interest in finding an effective method of depriving drug dealers of their profits. Since the definition of "innocent" is "acting in good faith, and without knowledge of incriminatory circumstances," 20 6 the only way that claimants truly meet this default is by proving both a lack of knowledge and a lack of consent. Only then can courts be sure that the owners are innocent and deserve to keep their property.
V. SOLUTION
It is obvious that the current statute creates certain inequities. Therefore, Congress should amend the statute to eliminate the negative effects on both the government and the claimants. Inserting a "willful blindness" prong and incorporating the Calero-Toledo defense would be one way to accomplish this objective. This would alleviate the concerns of both sides. The incorporation of the CaleroToledo defense would prevent the government from taking property from claimants like the father in 908 T Street, 20 7 who may have known about the illegal activity, but took positive steps to thwart it. Similarly, the inclusion of a "willful blindness" prong would eradicate the government's concern that claimants, like the landlord in 171-02 Liberty Avenue, could silently condone the illegal activity on their property, yet avoid forfeiture.
To prevent further confusion, Congress could take care to word the statute clearly. A possible example might be:
The claimant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she was not willfully blind to the fact that someone was using the prop-erty for illegal purposes. If a claimant is found to have been willfully blind, he or she cannot be considered an innocent owner. If a claimant succeeds in proving that he or she was not willfully blind, the claimant must then prove that he or she did not have actual knowledge that the property was connected to illegal drug activity. If, however, the claimant is found to have had actual knowledge of the illegal activity, and as a result of that knowledge, had done all that could be reasonably expected to prevent the illegal activity from continuing, that claimant's property shall not be forfeited.
VI. CONCLUSION
Until Congress chooses to amend the statute, courts must read the "innocent owner" provision of § 881 (a) (7) in the conjunctive. A logical reading of the clause, its legislative history, the legislative history of related clauses, subsequent clarifications, and basic principles of equity require claimants to prove both a lack of knowledge and a lack of consent to satisfy the innocent owner requirement of § 881(a) (7). Perhaps the injustices of the current "innocent owner" provision which this comment has pointed out, will prompt Congress to take action to help clear the smoke from the battlefield of the government's war on drugs.
